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INTRODUCTION 
NY A and Harrisons entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract with addenda 
( collectively "REPC") in November 2006 under the terms of which NY A was purchasing 
the Harrisons' real property with a closing date of October 31, 2007. The REPC 
permitted NY A, at its sole discretion, to make monthly $6,250.00 payments of additional 
earnest money, in addition to the initial $10,000 earnest money deposit, in order to extend 
~ the closing date of the REPC ·on a monthly basis beyond the original October 31, 2007 
closing date to the end of the next month. Beginning in October, 2007 NY A began 
paying the monthly additional earnest money deposits and paid the total amount of 
$137,503.00 in additional earnest money deposits to extend the closing date. 
Contrary to the express terms of the REPC they had signed, in March 2009, 
Harrisons unilaterally asserted that a reasonable time for NY A to close had already 
passed, that NY A was in breach by failing to close and dema11ded that NY A close by 
August 5, 2009 or they would exercise their rights under the REPC. The instant litigation · 
was commenced by NY A in June, 2009 asserting claims of rescission, breach of contract 
and declaratory judgment regarding the REPC. In July, 2009, Harrisons filed a 
counterclaim which asserted claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. On August 31, 2009, NY A tendered another $6,250 earnest 
~ money deposit in order to extend the closing date for an additional month. Although 
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NY A had the right to extend the closing in its sole discretion by making such monthly 
payment, because the August 31st payment was being tendered beyond Harrisons' 
arbitrarily and illegally demanded August 5, 2009 closing date and in light of the pending 
litigation, NY A included a letter of explanation as to its reasons for extending. The letter 
requested an acknowledgement from Harrisons that NY A was entitled to extend the 
closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC. Harrisons rejected NYA's 
valid tender, returned NY A's earnest money deposit, demanded the withdrawal of what 
were characterized as "inappropriate conditions" and asserted that the NYA's actions 
constituted additional breaches of the REPC. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted NYA's 
motion and denied Harrisot;is' motion, ruling that: 
(a) NYA was not obligated to close within a reasonable time because the 
REPC provided for a specific closing date and for unlimited monthly extensions of the 
specific closing date; 
(b) NY A had not breached the REPC or the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; 
(c) NYA's tender of the August 2009 earnest money payment was valid tender 
because it only included conditions that NY A had a right to insist upon; 
( d) Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the August 2009 tender of 
additional earnest money deposit; and 
2 
G 
( e) NY A was entitled to its contractual remedies under the REPC against 
Harrisons. 
NY A filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment for judgment for the return 
of its earnest money deposits, for liquidated damages in an amount equal to its earnest 
..JJ money deposits, interest and attorney's fees. NYA was granted judgment for the 
$147,503 earnest money deposits which it had paid to Harrisons, interest thereon but only 
from August 31, 2009 and certain of its attorneys fees. The court denied NYA's 
judgment for liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money deposits as 
provided in the REPC, and interest thereon because it incorrectly ruled that NYA had 
elected to pursue other remedies at law namely actual damages. The court failed to 
award certain of NYA's attorneys fees including some for research and client 
consultation because the trial court said the issues researched and issues discussed with 
the client were not described. The trial court also failed to award those attorneys fees 
associated with its liquidated damage claims because it was not the prevailing party on 
the liquidated damages issue. 
Harrisons appealed the judgement and NY A cross appealed with respect to the 
~ denial of its claims for liquidated damages, interest and attorneys fees. NY A submits 
herewith its Reply Brief as Cross-Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. NYA ELECTED TO AND WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES 
Harrisons argue that NY A elected the remedy of actual damages and that by electing such ~ 
remedy, NYA is precluded from seeking liquidated damages. Harrisons also argue for the 
first time that once NYA sued Harrisons that it foreclosed its option to demand and 
receive liquidated damages from Harrisons. That is not Utah law. The general rule of 
election of remedies is set forth in Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P .2d 772, 778, 
(Utah 1983) where the Supreme Court stated that: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its 
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double 
redress for a single wrong. Said do~trine presupposes a choice between 
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of 
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose 
to forego all others. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 
Utah, 603 P.2d 793, 796 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
As stated above, the purpose of election of remedies is to prevent a double 
redress for a single wrong. Contrary to Harrisons' position, the Utah Court of 
Appeals did not reject the application of Angelos_to the remedies under the Utah 
REPC. In Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), while 
quoting the above language, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: 
The Palmers contend that the holdings in the Andreasen line of cases are 
inconsistent with the election of remedies doctrine defined in Angelos v. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) ... Contrary to 
the Palmers' contention, the Andreasen line of cases does not conflict with 
Angelos. The Andreasen line does not dispute the fact that election of 
remedies is a procedural rule; the cases simply define the procedure for 
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electing remedies. The cases uniformly hold that before a seller may pursue 
a remedy other than liquidated damages, the seller must release any claim 
to the deposit money. Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 408; Dowding, 555 P.2d at 
957; Close, 354 P.2d at 857; McMullin, 349 P.2d at 721. 
Contrary to Harrisons' assertion, the general principles of Angelos apply to the 
REPC. Those applicable principles of Angelos are that the doctrine: (1) presupposes a 
choice between inconsistent remedies, (2) a knowledgeable selection of one of those 
choices, and (3) a resort to the chosen remedy that evinces a purpose to forego other 
vJ choices. It is just that the REPC and the cases which have interpreted them have defined 
the procedure for sellers to elect remedies under the REPC. 
From McKean v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) and other Utah 
cases, it is clear that the seller seeking to recover actual damages from the buyer must 
return the earnest money or the seller will be deemed to have elected to accept the earnest 
money as liquidated damages. Harrisons assert that there is no principled reason to treat 
a buyer under a REPC differently from a seller. Their assertion is not true because there 
viJ are significant differences between the sellers' circumstances and their elections and 
those of buyers generally and NY A in particular NY A that warrant different treatment. 
First, while there are a number of Utah cases that have addressed the election of 
remedies by a seller under a REPC, there are no Utah cases which have addressed the 
buyer' selection of remedies under a REPC. Nor for that matter are there Utah cases 
~ which have addressed the specifics of the buyer's election of liquidated damages versus 
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the buyer's election of actual damages under the REPC. The relevant Utah cases have 
been cases in which the seller has retained the earnest money deposit and has sought to 
nonetheless bring action for actual damages. The courts have deemed the retention of the 
eamest money as an election to recover liquidated damages and have refused to pennit 
such sellers to proceed with their actual damages claims. The Utah cases have not 
addressed what constitutes an election by the buyer to proceed with actual damages 
which ·would foreclose the buyer's right to seek liquidated damages. It is the supposed 
election by NY A of an actual damages remedy which the trial court and Harrisons claim 
precludes NYA from asserting its liquidated damages claim against Harrisons. No Utah 
cases have addressed such circumstance. 
Second, there are significant differences in the language of the instant REPC 
between a seller's remedies and its election of remedies versus a buyer's remedy and its 
election of remedies. REPC ,I16 provides as follows: 
DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest 
I 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to 
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. 
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer 
may elect to either accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest· Money 
Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this 
contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept 
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer 
upon demand. 
Under the language of,I16, a seller may elect to retain the earnest money as 
liquidated damages. ,I16 then states that in order to sue to specifically enforce the 
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contract or to pursue other remedies at law the seller is specifically required to "return 
[the earnest money] and sue Buyer ... " The various cases which have interpreted the 
above and similar language have held that it is the failure to return the earnest money 
which constitutes an election to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. Under 
such cases, in order for sellers to sue to enforce the contract or to pursue other remedies 
at law, sellers are contractually obligated to first return the earnest money deposit "and" 
then they can sue. Consistent with the language of the REPC, sellers who have not first 
returned the earnest money are not permitted to sue to obtain actual damages. See 
McKeon v. Crump .. 2002 UT App 258, 53 P.3d 494 and the various cases cited therein at 
page 496. Consistent with Angelos, sellers' retention of the earnest money is their 
knowledgeable selection of the choice to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
~ and their retention of the earnest money is their resort to their chosen liquidated damages 
remedy evincing a purpose to forego other remedy choices. 
However, different language applies to the buyer under the REPC. If a seller 
defaults, under if 16, in addition to the return of the earnest money, a buyer may "elect to 
accept from seller a sum equal to the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or 
va may sue seller to specifically enforce the contract or may pursue other remedies available 
at law." Under such language a way that a buyer elects liquidated damages is if the buyer 
"accept from seller a sum equal to the earnest money deposit'.'. The common meaning of 
"accept" is "to take or receive (something offered)" Random House Webster's College 
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Dictionary ( 1999). Applying that meaning to the above contract language, a buyer would 
be deemed to have elected liquidated damages if they "received" and "accepted" a sum 
equal to the earnest money. There is no evidence that NY A ever received or accepted 
from Harrisons a sum equal to the earnest money deposit. If Harrisons had paid NY A a 
sum equal to the earnest money deposits and NY A had "accepted" such sum, then NY A 
would be deemed to have elected the remedy of liquidated damages under 116 and would 
be precluded from proceeding with a claim for actual damages. An alternative legal 
meaning of "accept" is in the context of contract formation and other similar 
circumstances in which if an offer is made to a party, that party can "accept" the offer, 
thereby forming a contract. There is no evidence that Harrisons ever even offered to pay 
NY A an amount equal to the earnest money deposits as liquidated damages, so there was 
no offer of a sum equal to the earnest money as liquidated damages that NY A could or 
did accept. The last sentence of116 states: "If Buyer elects to accept liquidated 
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand." This 
language indicates that there is an alternate election of liquidated damages by the buyer 
that could be made other than the actual acceptance of an amount equal to the earnest 
money. But unlike the earlier language of 116, the election under this sentence is based 
on the buyer's "electing" to accept liquidated damages. No specific procedure or method 
for the election is contractually specified. As such the buyer would be deemed to have 
made such election if the buyer had complied with the requirements of Angelos, namely 
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the buyer had made a knowledgeable selection of a particular remedy and had resorted to 
that chosen remedy evincing a purpose to forego all other remedies. There is no evidence 
~ 
that NY A made a knowledgeable selection of actual damages nor that it resorted to actual 
damages as its chosen remedy evidencing a purpose to forgo other remedies such as 
~ liquidated damages. 
The third difference between sellers and buyers is that the default clause on the 
election of remedies is to be more strictly applied to sellers. This is due, at least in part, 
to the fact that sellers have received and continue to hold the earnest money deposit. As 
stated in McKeon, supra, at page 496, quoting Close v. Blumenthal, 11 Utah 2d 51,354 
P .2d 856, 857 (1960) the default clause is "almost invariably against a purchaser" and the 
"suit is by a seller who wants to be sure to keep the money in hand, and also seek 
additional relief." For that reason the courts have stated that: "Under those 
circumstances the clause should be strictly applied against the seller and he should be 
held to meet its requirements with exactness. ,, These same type circumstances exist in 
the instant case. The Harrisons have received the initial $10,000.00 earnest money 
deposit that was released to them as well as the subsequent monthly earnest money 
v)) deposits totaling $137,503.00 that were also released to them. (,I9 of Addendum No. 1 of 
REPC, RISS, R142, R151, Second Affidavit of Steven Kelly ,I,I 7-8, R283 and Affidavit 
of Steven Kelly ,Il 9, R817). Despite having received such substantial amounts of earnest 
money and having breached the REPC, Harrisons have retained all of the earnest money. 
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They have neither returned the earnest money nor paid any of the liquidated damage 
amount to NY A nor offered to pay or return any such amounts. As referenced in 
McKeon and Close, Harrisons seek to keep the money in hand. 
While the default clause is to be strictly applied against the Harrisons as sellers, 
Utah cases do not provide that it is to be similarly strictly applied to NYA as buyers. Nor 
is there any reason to strictly apply it against buyers nor to apply it in the same way 
against the buyer. NY A p~id the earnest money to Harrisons and does not continue to 
hold such money. It seeks the return of the earnest money deposit and an amount equal 
to the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages to compensate it for the Harrisons' 
breach. 
Despite Harrisons unwillingness to return the earnest money they had received and 
to pay liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money they had received, 
Harrisons' interpretation of the contract regarding the election of remedies, result in NY A 
being faced with a Robson's Choice regarding liquidated damages: namely NY A must 
either ( 1) accept from the Harrisons a sum equal to the earnest money as liquidated 
damages (which Harrisons had not offered nor were willing to offer) or (2) bring suit 
against Harrisons and thereby lose their entitlement to recover liquidated damages from 
Harrisons. Because, according to Harrisons, once a buyer sues the seller, it forecloses the 
option of demanding and receiving liquidated damages from the seller. (Harrisons brief 
at page 20.) Harrisons cite no case law to support their interpretation. The illogic of their 
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position is readily apparent. If, as in the instant case, the seller does not voluntarily 
return the earnest money paid and does not pay the buyer an amount equal to the earnest 
~ 
money paid as liquidated damages, then the only recourse for the buyer would to bring 
suit against the seller for such return and liquidated damages. However, according to 
·~ Harrisons, if the buyer brings suit against the seller, then it forecloses the buyer's right to 
receive and buyer is not entitled to receive liquidated damages. The result under 
Harrisons' argument, is that by bringing suit against the seller the buyer has elected to 
pursue its remedies at law and must pursue such remedies, including actual damages, 
instead. Moreover, under Harrisons' argument, the last sentence of,I16 is also effectively 
unenforceable. The last sentence provides that if the buyer elects to accept liquidated 
damages the seller agrees to pay them upon demand. But, if the seller fails to pay the 
liquidated damages demanded and the buyer sues to recover the liquidated damages, 
under Harrisons' argument, when the suit is brought by the buyer, it forecloses the 
buyer's option to receive the liquidated damages demanded. Under Harrisons' 
nonsensical interpretation of the REPC, there is no way for a buyer to recover liquidated 
damages that a seller does not voluntarily pay. The provision for buyer's right to 
liquidated damages is effectively written out of the REPC. The REPC cannot be 
interpreted to grant a buyer a meaningless and unenforceable remedy for or an impossible 
entitlement to the contractually provided liquidated damages remedy. 
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Harrisons base their interpretation of,f16 on the use of "or" in ,f16's language 
regarding buyer's remedies which Harrisons assert is disjunctive. It is true that the term 
"or" is generally disjunctive but even though "or" may be disjunctive, it is not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Sometimes "or" is used in a context in which the alternates are 
mutually exclusive such as "The man is either a Utah resident or is not a Utah resident." 
A man could not be both. However, the most common usage of the disjunctive "or" does 
not denote mutually exclusive alternates. For example, "A man can walk or run to the 
store" is not mutually exclusive. A man could either walk to the store, or he could run to 
the store, or he could do both by walking part of the way and running part of the way. 
Similarly, a check paid to the order of John Doe "or" Jane Doe can be signed or endorsed 
by either John Doe or Jane Doe to be a valid endorsement. But it can also be endorsed by 
both John Doe and Jane Doe and would still be a valid endorsement. The endorsement 
by one of them does not preclude the other from also endorsing the check as well nor 
does it invalidate the endorsement of either party. See, also, Hebertson v. Bank One, 
Utah, N.A., 995 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah App (1999) where the party was only required to satisfy 
. one of two conditions separated by "or" but there is no indication that one and only one 
of such conditions could be met; In Re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207,215 (Utah 
1997) where use of "or" did not require all three provisions to be met, but any one of the 
three, or for that matter satisfying all three provisions were sufficient, but again there is 
no indication that one and only one condition could be met; and most helpful Edwards v. 
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Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 214 P.3d 120, 128 (Utah 2009) where use of the disjunctive 
"or" in Rule l l(c)(2) did not limit the court to imposing a single sanction but allowed the 
imposition of both sanctions which were separated by the word "or". 
More significantly, the underlying concept of election of remedies does not require 
~ the pleading of one but only one remedy to the exclusion of the other remedy. As 
previously stated in NY A's brief, modem pleading practice allows a party to plead 
alternative theories and damages, to have their alternative theories presented to the court 
or jury and to be awarded the relief to which the party is entitled (See NY A's brief at 
pages 38 and 39). In Angelos the plaintiff had sought judgments against a bank as well as 
the individual defendants. Election of remedies did not preclude such alternate pleading 
nor the recovery of judgments against both under the alternate pleading. Rather as stated 
above, election of remedies merely prevents double recovery for a single wrong. 
Harrisons argue that NY A apparently recognized the choice between demanding 
liquidated damages and suing Harrisons because it did not mention liquidated damages in 
its allegations or prayer for relief. Harrisons have no basis for making such assertion 
about NY A. As previously mentioned, in its initial brief, the Utah Rules of Civil 
vJ Procedure impose very limited notice pleading requirements for pleading as to a claim. 
·,.J 
The amended complaint sets forth its various claims including a claim for damages. In 
the prayer on the second claim, upon which the court granted NY A's motion for 
summary judgment as to Harrisons' breach, NY A prayed that the REPC should be 
13 
rescinded and for an award of the return of its earnest money, but also prayed consistent 
with the alternative damage claim of the second claim that if the court determined that the 
REPC was binding that it prayed for "a judgment awarding New York the damages that it 
incurred as a result of the Defendants' breach of the REPC." 
Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition defines damages as "Money claimed 'by, 
or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury." Black's defines 
actual damages as "An amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven 
injury or loss". Black's also defines liquidated damages as "An amount contractually 
stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered by one party if 
the other party breaches." Liquidated damages are a means of measuring, estimating or 
determining the damages suffered by the nonbreaching party as a result of the breaches of 
the defaulting party to a contract. Since liquidated damages are a contractually stipulated 
estimate of the actual damages occurring from a breach they are and would be included in 
the prayer for damages alleged by NY A as to its second claim. 
Most importantly, Harrisons' brief does not address but misses the error in the trial 
court's ruling. The trial court held that NYA was obligated to make a written notice or 
demand on the Harrisons for liquidated damages and that by failing to do so NY A had 
contractually elected to pursue actual damages. Such ruling is inconsistent with the 
language of,ll6 of the REPC and Angelos. There is nothing in the language of,ll6 
which requires the buyer to make a written demand for liquidated damages in order to 
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seek liquidated damages as its remedy. Rather, as discussed above, the contractual 
language provides that acceptance from Seller of a sum equal to the earnest money 
vi) 
deposit may serve as the election. Alternatively, a buyer can elect to accept liquidated 
damages. But no procedure is defined or described for this alternate election. Without a 
viJ defined method or procedure, then under Angelos, the buyer would elect the liquidated 
damages when it made a knowledgeable selection of liquidated damages and resorted to 
it in a manner which evidenced a purpose and intent to forego the other remedies 
available to the buyer. By the same token, a buyer would elect the actual damages 
remedy when it made a knowledgeable selection of actual damages as its remedy and 
resorted to actual damages in a manner which evidenced a purpose and intent to forego 
the other remedies available to the buyer such as liquidated damages. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence of an election by NY A of the actual 
damages remedy, not in the amended complaint or otherwise. There is no evidence of 
NY A resorting to the actual damages remedy in a manner that evidenced its purpose and 
intent to forego its other remedies, in particular there is no evidence of anything that 
NY A did to evince that it was foregoing its claim to liquidated damages. In contrast it is 
clear that NYA made a knowledgeable selection of liquidated damages as its remedy. In 
NYA's motion for summary judgment filed on January 9, 2012 and the memoranda in 
support of the motion, NY A sought not only the return of the earnest money which had 
been paid, but liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money which had 
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been paid (R.178-9, 290-319 (particularly 293-5), 354-382 (particularly 355). Also in 
NY A's motion for summary judgment for damages filed on December 13, 2013 and the 
memoranda in support of such motion, NY A again sought the return of the earnest money 
it had paid and liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money (R. 728-752, 
R. 822-852). None of such amended complaint, motions, memoranda, or other pleadings · 
nor any other facts evidence that NY A resorted to any other remedy, including a9tual 
damages evincing a purpose to forego liquidated damages. 
In summary, NY A did not elect actual damages and it did not forego its right to 
seek liquidated damages from Harrisons. The judgment of the trial court so ruling and 
denying NY A's right to recover liquidated damages from Harrisons in the amount of the 
earnest money paid by NY A to Harrisons should be reversed. The court should remand 
the matter to award NY A liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money paid by 
NY A to Harrisons and to award NY A its attorneys fees associated with its claim for 
liquidated damages, both at trial and on appeal. 
II. NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
The trial court failed to award certain of NY A's attorneys fees because the 
descriptions of the work identified research, but without a description of the subjects or 
issues researched, and also failed to award certain of NY A's attorneys fees for discussion 
of legal issues with NY A because the legal issues discussed were not detailed. NY A 
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objected to providing such detail because it would involve the disclosure of attorney 
work product and may involve the disclosure of confidential attorney client privileged 
information. But NY A did provide affidavits that the research performed were relative to 
the issues included in the various memoranda and were otherwise relevant and necessary 
to the prosecution of its claims. Although Utah case law does require a reasonably 
detailed description of the time spent and work performed, Harrisons have cited no cases 
which have required detailed descriptions of the research or the subjects of the research 
performed or to detail the legal issues discussed with a client. There is no case law which 
requires such detail. 
The court should remand the matter to the trial court to award additional attorneys 
fees for the attorney yvork that was denied because the descriptions of the work 
~ performed did not include the subjects or issues researched or the legal issues discussed 
with the client. 
III. NY A IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM 
viP THE DATE OF EACH PAYMENT OF EARNEST MONEY. 
Harrisons argue that NY A is only entitled to prejudgment interest from the 
August 31, 2009 date of breach and not from the date of each payment of earnest money. 
In support Harrisons cite the Court to the case of Staker v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 664 P .2d 1188, 1191 (Utah 1983). Harrisons assert that Staker stands for 
the proposition that prejudgment interest is to be awarded not from the date of each 
17 
overpayment of irrigation fees but from the date the overpayment is establish. However, 
the actual ruling in Staker was that Mr. Staker was entitled to interest on the refund of 
overpaid fees, for some undiscussed reason, from the date of his demand for such refund. 
In responding to Staker, the Utah Supreme Court in Trail Mt. Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Utah 1996) discounted the ruling in Staker because 
it involved what the Court characterized as "a relatively unique fact situation involving 
the refund of overpaid amounts". Instead in Trail Mt. Coal Co., the Utah Supreme Court 
held that prejudgment interest accrued from the date each payment of royalties was due, 
not the date of demand. Id. at 13 7 l. In doing so, the Court relied on Bjork v. April 
Indus., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) and its statement that: "where the damage is 
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time .... " 
Harrisons argue that Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 241, 75 P.3d 925 cited by 
NY A and which awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the respective payments 
under a real estate contract is inapplicable because it involved rescission of a contract as 
opposed to damages from a breach of contract. It is true that Anderson involved the 
remedy of rescission, but the recission resulted from a breach of the contract (involving 
an encumbrance on the property) versus a claimed fraud. It is also true that the goal of 
rescission is to return the parties to the status quo that existed prior to the parties' 
agreement. Id at ,r1 1. But the purpose of an award of damages, particularly as applied to 
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the facts in the instant case, is not significantly different. As stated in Mahmood v. Ross 
(In re Estate of Ross), 1999 UT 104, 990 P.2d 933, ,I19 (Utah 1999): 
"As a general rule, legal damages serve the imp011ant purpose of compensating an 
injured party for actual injury sustained, so that she may be restored, as nearly as 
possible, to the position she was in prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. 
Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages§§ 1, 3 
(1966). 
The award of prejudgment interest assists in such restoration process by giving the 
damaged party the benefit of interest on such damages for the period prior to the entry of 
judgment. As stated in Trail Mt. Coal Co., Supra at page 1370: 
As a matter of public policy, an award of prejudgment interest simply serves to 
compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, 
as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is 
liquidated and owing. 
,I16 of the REPC provides that in the event of a breach of the REPC that the buyer 
is entitled to the return of the earnest money deposits which it has made. Because of the 
breach by Harrisons, NY A is entitled to be restored as nearly as possible to the position it 
~ was in prior to the injury in accordance with the REPC. As such and in accordance with 
ifl6 NYA is entitled to the return of the earnest money deposits which it had paid 
Harrisons. Harrisons have had the various earnest money deposits paid by NY A and the 
benefit of their use while NY A has not had such funds nor been able to use such funds. 
Moreover, as generally recognized and as identified in Trail Mt. Coal Co., there has been 
depreciation in the value of those monies over the period of time that Harrisons have had 
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the monies and used them. Under both Trail Mt. Coal Co. and Mahmood, NY A is 
entitled to be compensated for both the loss of use of their funds paid to Harrisons and 
their depreciated value which has occurred during the time that Harrisons have had and 
used such funds. The mechanism to so compensate NY A is by awarding NY A 
prejudgment interest on those funds at the statutory rate provided in UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 15-1-1 (2) from the date each respective payment was paid by NY A and not just from the 
date of Harrisons' breach of the REPC as was awarded by the trial court. Also, if NY A 
is not awarded prejudgment interest for the periods prior to Harrisons' breach, then 
Harrisons will have been rewarded for their breach by the interest free use of NY A's 
monies. 
To comport with the above principles, the court should remand. the matter to the 
trial court to award NY A prejudgment interest on each of the earnest money payments it 
paid to Harrisons from the dates thereof, and not just from the date of the Harrisons 
breach. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should deny Harrisons' appeal and should affirm the court's orders from 
which Harrisons appealed. The court should reverse the court's order that NY A elected 
actual damages and should remand the matter to the trial court to award NY A liquidated 
damages and interest on the liquidated damages, to award NY A interest on the earnest 
money payments from the dates thereof and to award attorney fees relative to its claims 
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for liquidated damages, for research work not awarded and for its attorneys fees on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of August, 2015. 
avid D. Jeffs 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Ap ellee/Cross Appellant 
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(801) 373-8848 
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